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DEFENDING AGAINST DEFENSE: CIVIL 
RESISTANCE, NECESSITY AND THE UNITED 
STATES MILITARY'S TOXIC LEGACY 
Kyle Bettigole* 
There are some who say that there is absolutely no prospect of the 
administration or the Congress to bring this matter to a successful 
conclusion and that the track record proves it and that the only possi-
bility, however remote, the only possibility of survival lies in protest. If 
people believe that, who can say they are wrong?! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the midst of a toxic crisis. For nearly fifty 
years, the U.S. military,2 the nation's largest polluter,3 has threatened 
human health and the environment with the ceaseless dumping and 
improper disposal of noxious chemicals throughout virtually every 
state.4 Through widespread mishandling and mismanagement of ra-
dioactive waste, spent fuels, oils, solvents, paints, acids, heavy metals, 
and other hazardous materials,5 the Departments of Defense (DOD) 
* Production Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of David O'Very of the EPA and author Seth 
Shulman. 
1 Transcript of Judge's Order, People v. Lagrou, Nos. 85-000098 to 85-000100, 85-000102, slip 
op. at 10-11 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Mar. 22, 1985), cited in Laura J. Schulkind, Note, Applying the 
Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 94 (1989). 
2 For the purposes of this Comment, the term "military" includes the Department of Defense 
and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons facilities. 
3 NATIONAL TOXIC CAMPAIGN FUND, THE U.S. MILITARY'S TOXIC LEGACY at ii (1991) 
[hereinafter NTCF REPORT]. 
4 NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION/NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 
FROM CRISIS TO COMMITMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND COMPLIANCE AT FEDERAL 
FACILITIES, at inside cover (1990) [hereinafter NGAIN AAG REPORT]. See Seth Shulman, Oper-
ation Restore Earth: The U.S. Military Gets Ready to Clean Up After the Cold War, E MAG., 
MarJApr. 1993, at 37. 
5 NGAINAAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
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and Energy (DOE) have "cast a chemical plague over our country,"6 
creating a toxic legacy for the next several generations. 
As the owner of approximately 20,000 nuclear weapons, tremen-
dous fleets of planes, tanks, vehicles, and thousands of installations 
responsible for the development and maintenance of the nation's de-
fense machinery, the military continually must confront disposing of 
its wastes.7 Collectively, the DOD and the DOE generate approxi-
mately twenty million tons8 of hazardous9 or mixed hazardous and 
radioactive wastelO annually, or nearly one ton of waste every minute.ll 
Given the practical difficulties of handling such enormous amounts of 
waste, the DOD and the DOE historically have resorted to crude and 
improper waste disposal techniques12 which, consequently, have 
spawned an astounding number of hazardous waste sitesP 
The DOD, which oversees a vast complex of properties in the 
United States, has identified over 14,401 contaminated sites at 
1,579 of its facilities.14 These sites are the result of daily activ-
6 NTCF REPORT, supra note 3, at i. 
7 Shulman, supra note 4. 
8 H.R. REP. No. 102-111, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991). 
9 Hazardous waste is defined as: 
A solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may: 
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in 
serious reversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or 
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise man-
aged. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988). 
10 Mixed hazardous and radioactive waste is hazardous waste that is mixed with radioactive 
materials. See Barbara A. Finamore, Regulating Hazardous and Mixed Waste at Department 
of Energy Nuclear Weapons Facilities: Reversing Decades of Environmental Neglect, 9 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 84 (1985). Radioactive waste is defined as "solid, liquid, or gaseous material 
resulting from weapons production that contains radionuclides in excess of threshold quanti-
ties." U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPLEX CLEANUP: THE EN-
VIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION 211 (1991) [hereinafter OTA 
REPORT]. Radionuclides are defined as "certain natural and manmade atomic species with 
unstable nuclei that can undergo spontaneous breakup or decay, and in the process, emit Alpha 
(helium nuclei), Beta (fast electron streams) particles, and Gamma rays (short X-rays), collec-
tively !mown as radiation." Id. 
11 Shulman, supra note 4. 
12 See NGAJNAAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (waste disposal practices have included 
"dumping [wastes] in unlined pits, lagoons, and landfills, and using sewer drains for disposal"). 
13 See infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text. 
14 CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL LIABILITIES UNDER HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS, S. Doc. 
No. 95, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL LIABILITIES]. A hazardous waste 
site is a specific place containing hazardous wastes, thus one facility or installation may include 
numerous sites. Id. For example, the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Reservation in Washington 
state is one facility, however it contains over 3,000 hazardous waste sites. Id. 
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ityl5 throughout the twentieth century where the DOD "allowed the 
leakage of oil and other fuels, drained toxic chemicals into waterways, 
dumped lethal sludge at unlined landfills and littered the country with 
unexploded shells and bombs."16 Presently, over 120 DOD sites are 
included on the Superfund National Priorities List, and this number 
continues to increaseY Meanwhile, DOD clean-up efforts to date ac-
count for less than two percent of the wastes identified on current and 
former military installations.18 
The DOE's fourteen major nuclear weapons production facilities,19 
similarly, have released millions of tons of radioactive and non-radio-
active toxic pollutants into the environment, creating approximately 
nine thousand contaminated nuclear waste sites throughout the United 
States.20 Recently, the Senate Committee on Armed Services commis-
sioned the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an independent 
research arm of Congress, to investigate and report on the problems 
created by the DOE's nuclear weapons complex. The OTA summa-
rized: 
Contamination of soil, sediments, surface water, and groundwater 
throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex is extensive. At every 
facility the groundwater is contaminated with radionuclides21 or 
hazardous chemicals. Most sites in nonarid locations also have 
surface water contamination. Millions of cubic meters of radioac-
tive and hazardous wastes have been buried throughout the com-
plex, and there are few adequate records of burial site locations 
and contents. Contaminated soils and sediments of all categories 
are estimated to total billions of cubic meters.22 
The environmental contamination problems at DOE facilities are so 
extreme that their technical dimensions are considered as complex as 
The EPA defines a facility as "an installation or landholding encompassing all contiguous land 
owned by a department or agency of the United States." [d. Facilities include defense installa-
tions, research laboratories, government office buildings, national parks, and national forests. 
[d. Some estimates indicate that 15,000 contaminated sites are present at 1,900 facilities nation-
wide. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE FEDERAL FACILITIES DIALOGUE COMMITTEE 2 (1993) 
[hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT]. 
15 SETH SHULMAN, THE THREAT AT HOME: CONFRONTING THE ToXIC LEGACY OF THE U.S. 
MILITARY 24 (1992). 
16 Bruce Van Voorst, A Thousand Paints of Blight, TIME MAG., Nov. 9,1992, at 68. 
17 Shulman, supra note 4. 
18 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 8. 
19 OTA REPORT, supra note 10, at 15 n.lo 
20 KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-2. 
21 See supra note 10 for the definition of "radionuclides." 
22 OTA REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. 
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those existing anywhere in the world.23 Virtually all of these facilities 
are included on the Superfund National Priorities List24 and, as of 
1992, none of them had been decontaminated.25 
Cost estimates for the cleanup of the DOD's and the DOE's hazard-
ous waste sites are enormous. The DOD estimates that $35 billion to 
$65 billion is needed to clean up its own sites,26 while the United States 
General Accounting Office indicates that it will cost approximately 
$95 billion to $130 billion to remediate sites at DOE facilities.27 Yet the 
non-economic costs of the military's contamination crisis exact an even 
greater toll on the public, for the health problems and environmental 
degradation which these wastes create are tremendous. Skin burns 
and rashes, chronic illnesses such as cancer, brain damage, nerve and 
digestive disorders, and reproductive problems are among the many 
health dangers created by direct contact with hazardous substances, 
or indirect exposure to contaminated air or drinking water.28 Similarly, 
improperly discarded wastes threaten vegetation, wildlife, and valu-
able natural environments such as national parks and wetlands. 
Although government facilities must comply with federal and state 
hazardous waste laws,29 individual states and the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) historically have been unable 
to hold the military accountable for its wastes.30 Though many of the 
DOD's and the DOE's contamination problems began when few laws 
and regulations addressed the disposal of hazardous wastes,31 the 
military's contamination practices continued even after Congress im-
plemented major environmentallegislation,32 including the Resource 
23 KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. 
24 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 187. 
25Id. at 8. 
26 NGAINAAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
27Id. Some estimates have indicated the cleanup costs for DOE facilities will be as great as 
$300 billion over the next thirty years. Government Waste: The Hit List, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 
1993. 
28 FEDERAL LIABILITIES, supra note 14, at 9. Groundwater can become contaminated when 
wastes improperly disposed in landfills or shallow surface impoundments pass through the soil. 
Id. Hazardous waste can corrode metal drums or storage tanks as well, resulting in leakage into 
surrounding soil and nearby surface water or groundwater. Id. Rain and surface waters also can 
carry uncovered wastes off-site, contaminating surrounding soil and groundwater. Air contami-
nation occurs when vapors rise from uncovered waste sites. Id. 
29 See infra notes 256-67, 332-38 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 268--,314 and accompanying text. See generally J.B. Wolverton, Note, Sov-
ereign Immunity and National Priorities: Enforcing Federal Facilities Compliance with En-
vironmental Statutes, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 565 (1991); Elizabeth Cheng, Comment, Law-
maker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil Penalties Against Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 845 (1990). 
31 KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-3. 
32 See infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text. 
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Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).33 The EPA, in fact, 
confirmed that the federal government, including DOD and DOE 
facilities, regularly fails to comply with hazardous waste management 
laws, and that its compliance rates are between ten to fifteen percent 
lower than private industry compliance rates.34 
Since the late 1970s, in response to the military's ongoing pollution 
activity and its threat to human health and the environment, con-
cerned citizens have engaged in acts of non-violent civil resistance 
against the DOD and the DOE.35 These protests have sought to pres-
sure the military to stop disposing its wastes in violation of hazardous 
waste laws, and to hold it accountable for these contamination prob-
lems.36 The protesters' acts of civil resistance have included trespass-
ing in restricted areas at a nuclear weapons facility37 and blocking 
roadways and entrances outside military bases.38 Thousands of arrests 
for these demonstrations have occurred,39 resulting in penalties rang-
ing from fines for misdemeanor violations, to prison terms for criminal 
felony convictions.40 
Once charged with violating the law, these protesters frequently 
have asserted the necessity defense to explain the basis for their 
behavior.41 The necessity defense is an affirmative defense which pos-
its that for reasons of social policy, an individual is justified in violating 
33 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
34 H.R. REP. No. 102-111, supra note 8, at 2. 
35 Civil resistance is distinguishable from civil disobedience in that an act of civil resistance 
violates a law which is not itself the object of protest. See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 
196 (9th Cir. 1992); Schulkind, supra note 1, at 79--80. For example, lunch counter sit-ins in the 
1960s were protests against laws which prohibited persons of a specific race from sitting in 
particular areas of a restaurant. Schoon, 971 F.2d at 196. In these situations, individuals were 
"protesting the existence of a law by breaking that law or by preventing the execution of that 
law in a specific instance in which a particularized harm would otherwise follow." [d. Military 
demonstrators are not protesting a law against trespass, however. Rather, they are protesting 
the DOD's and the DOE's operating practices. See FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, DEFENDING 
CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1987); Joel H. Levitan, Putting The 
Gavernment On Trial: The Necessity Defense and Social Change, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1221, 1225 
(1987). 
36 See, e.g., Myron Levin, Nuclear Protesters Plan 'Lesser of 2 Evils' Defense, WASHINGTON 
POST, Nov. 17, 1978, at A4. Over 250 arrests were made outside the Rocky Flats nuclear 
weapons plant when a citizens group protested "past and present radioactive emissions" from 
the plant. [d. 
37 [d. 
38 Theresa M. Hanfin, Activist Found Guilty in Otis Air Base Protest, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
17, 1987, at 15. 
39 See generally Creative Defenses in Civil Disobedience Cases, 42 GUILD PRAC. 1 (1985) 
(discussing numerous cases involving civil disobedience and civil resistance arrests). 
40 See Levin, supra note 36. For example, one Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant protester 
was charged with four counts of trespass and three of obstruction, and these violations carried 
prison terms of over three years. [d. 
41 See, e.g., Andrews v. People, 800 P.2d 607, 611 (Colo. 1990). 
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a law if "the harm which will result from compliance with the law is 
greater than that which will result from the violation of it."42 Ex-
pressed another way, the law should promote the achievement of 
higher values at the expense of lesser values, and sometimes the 
greater good for society is achieved by violating, rather than comply-
ing with the law.43 
When civil resistance defendants successfully interpose the neces-
sity defense, juries find them not guilty of violating the literal lan-
guage of the law.44 Courts do not automatically permit a defendant to 
raise the necessity defense, however. The defendant first must intro-
duce enough evidence so that a reasonable juror45 may conclude that 
the evidence satisfies each required element of the defense.46 If the 
defendant satisfies this burden, the judge must permit the defense, 
and instruct the jury accordingly.47 'TYPically, in civil resistance or civil 
disobedience cases,48 courts refuse to present a necessity defense 
instruction to the jury.49 Nearly every reported state and federal 
appellate decision has rejected the application of the necessity defense 
under these circumstances because the defendants have been unable 
to satisfy the court's assessment of what constitutes "necessity."50 
42 W. LAFAVE & A. SeoTI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4, at 627 (1986). LaFave & Scott 
explain that: 
When the pressure of circumstances presents one with a choice of evils, the law prefers 
that he avoid the greater evil by bringing about the lesser evil. The evil involved in 
violating the terms of the criminal law ... may be less than that which would result 
from literal compliance with the law ... . 
Id. at 629. The necessity defense also is frequently described as the "choice of evils" or "defense 
of justification." See id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). 
43 LAFAVE & SeOTI, supra note 42, § 5.4, at 629. 
44 I d. at 630. 
45 This Comment contemplates trials in which a jury presides, because most of the cited case 
law concerned jury trials. A jury-waived or bench trial presumably requires the same showing 
of evidence in order to raise an affirmative defense, therefore, the arguments presented in this 
Comment are equally applicable to non-jury proceedings. See Schulkind, supra note 1, at 86 
n.39. 
46Id. at 80. The required elements of the necessity defense are discussed infra notes 79-81 
and accompanying text. 
47 Schulkind, supra note 1, at 80. 
48 See supra note 35 for a distinction between acts of civil resistance and acts of civil disobe-
dience. 
49 An alarming trend is the use of the motion in limine to preclude any evidence from reaching 
the jury. See generally Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: 
Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1987). The motion in limine is a written 
motion typically made prior to, or at the beginning of a trial, which dispenses with prejudicial 
statements, evidence, and, as in the case of a civil resistance defendant, an affirmative defense, 
before it reaches the jury. Id. at 1271-72. A judge also may defer ruling on the motion until the 
defendant raises the affirmative defense at trial. Id. at 1271 n.1. 
50 For example, in the nuclear weapons context, many demonstrators have argued unsuccess-
fully that their actions were necessary to prevent the United States from violating various 
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The motivations and reasons underlying the civil resistance activi-
ties at military facilities created a tenable reason for courts to permit 
the necessity defense, however. Because the DOD and the DOE rou-
tinely violated environmental laws and shielded themselves from pun-
ishment,51 nonviolent civil resistance since the late 1970s was both 
justifiable and necessary to protect human health and the environ-
ment, and to hold the military accountable for its behavior. 
This Comment thus reevaluates the necessity defense in the con-
text of the environmental contamination and human health dangers 
that the military posed, and continues to pose, to the public. It adopts 
the protester's perspective in urging that civil resistance has been 
defensible as a means to prevent the DOD and the DOE from threat-
ening the public and the environment, and as a vehicle to coerce the 
military into greater environmental compliance. Section II of this 
Comment presents a brief history of the necessity defense and articu-
lates the elements of the defense which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to receive a jury instruction on the defense. 52 Section III applies 
the elements of the necessity defense to military protests and ana-
lyzes how nonviolent civil resistance in this context satisfies each 
element.53 Specifically, Section III evaluates the contamination prob-
lems endemic to the DOD and the DOE, and examines how these 
agencies historically circumvented compliance with RCRA.54 It ar-
gues that RCRA's inability to reign in the military and subject it to 
United Nations and international law agreements and declarations. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 566-B7 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir. 
1979). Nuclear weapons demonstrators also have urged to no avail that their protesting was 
necessary to prevent the imminent threat of a nuclear war. See, e.g., United States v. Brodhead, 
714 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Mass. 1989); People v. Weber, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. 
Ct. 1984). Nuclear power demonstrators have argued that power plants present the threat of a 
major nuclear accident as well as long-term threats to human health due to the effects of 
low-level radiation. See, e.g., State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979). Neither contention has 
been persuasive. See infm notes 99-107 and accompanying text. The defense has been raised 
successfully in a number of unreported state trial court decisions, however. Compilations of 
these cases may be obtained through The Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute in Berkeley, 
California. 
51 See infra notes 268-314 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text. 
58 See infra notes 83-331 and accompanying text. 
54 See infm notes 136-95, 268-314 and accompanying text. This Comment focuses primarily 
on RCRA since RCRA is the most comprehensive environmental legislation concerning the 
generation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste, and since issues concerning RCRA have 
presented perhaps the greatest impediments to ensuring environmental compliance by the 
military. See infm notes 268-91 and accompanying text. However, the issues it addresses also 
have been raised regarding compliance with other environmental laws such as the Clean Air 
and Clean Water Acts. See, e.g., Michael D. Axline et aI., Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties 
in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 1, 20-32 
(1987). 
674 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:667 
local, state, and EPA authority created a climate ripe for citizens to 
engage in justifiable acts of nonviolent civil resistance. Section IV 
concludes by evaluating whether future acts of civil resistance against 
the military are defensible under the necessity defense in light of Con-
gress' recent enactment of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act.55 
This legislation, which now expressly subjects the military to all 
federal, state, interstate, and local solid waste laws,56 breathes new 
life into RCRA and efforts to regulate the military's waste disposal 
practices. 57 
II. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE DEFINED 
The necessity defense arises from a social policy which recognizes 
that at times the law must be violated to achieve a moral imperative.58 
This imperative derives from an individual's belief that a tremendous 
harm is occurring, and that a particular action is necessary to deter 
or eliminate this harm.59 The individual invokes the necessity defense 
as a means to explain why she justifiably broke the law. The defendant 
admits that she committed the act for which she is charged, and that 
such an act technically violates the law.60 The defendant contends, 
however, that such conduct was "justified because it was the only 
feasible way to avoid a greater evil;" therefore, "it would be unjust to 
apply the law in the particular case."61 
The history of the necessity defense in the United States traces 
back to the nineteenth century.62 Courts invoked the defense in a 
myriad of situations involving emergencies arising out of the forces 
of nature. For example, in The William Gray, a court found a ship-
master not guilty of violating an embargo act forbidding his ship entry 
into a port when adverse weather forced the crew to seek refuge in 
the port.63 In the late nineteenth century, prison escapees dissatisfied 
55 See 42 U.S.C.A §§ 6903, 6908, 6924, 6927, 6939c-4i93ge, 6961, 6965 (West 1993), discussed 
infra notes 332~9 and accompanying text. 
56Id. § 6961(a). 
57 See infra Section IV. 
58 See Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me Do It: The Appli-
cability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1987). 
59Id. 
60 Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The 
Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 294 (1974). 
61Id. 
62 See Matthew Lippman, The Necessity Defense and Political Protest, 26 CRIMINAL LAW 
BULLETIN 317, 319 (1990). 
63 The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810). See also United States v. Ashton, 24 
F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (mutiny necessary where ship held unseaworthy); Seavy v. 
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with prison conditions and their treatment while incarcerated unsuc-
cessfully tried to assert the defense.64 The prison protest cases were 
a precursor to the use of the necessity defense in situations where 
individuals "protest, call attention to, or bring about a change in a 
social condition or political policies."65 
The first widespread use of the defense in civil resistance protests 
occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when anti-Vietnam war 
demonstrators were arrested for protest activity.66 For example, in 
United States v. Moylan, a group of antiwar protesters entered a local 
selective service board and destroyed files with napalm.67 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the protesters 
the necessity defense, stating: 
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to 
which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves 
as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal 
system could long survive if it gave every individual the option of 
disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal stand-
ard was judged morally untenable.68 
Civil resistance defendants subsequently have used, and continue to 
use the necessity defense as a defense for protest activity in a wide 
variety of social contexts, including: nuclear power and weapons pro-
duction,69 the anti-abortion movement,7° United States policy and in-
Preble, 64 Me. 120 (1874) (clothing destroyed to prevent spread of disease); Surocco v. Geary, 3 
Cal. 69 (1853) (property destroyed to prevent spread of fire). 
The defense was raised successfully in other situations as well which were not the result of 
natural forces. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851) (military necessity to 
seize property); Morey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487 (1884) (traveler turned out onto abutting land 
to avoid obstruction); Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312 (N.Y. 1816) (shooting mad dog in the 
street). For a detailed discussion of the necessity defense, see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 
394 (1980). See also Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation Case, 
3 ARIZ. L. REV. 264 (1961). 
64 See, e.g., People v. Richards, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (no necessity for 
prison escape arising out of dissatisfaction with prison sentence); People v. Whipple, 279 P. 1008, 
1010 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929) (no necessity for prison escape arising out of unsanitary prison 
conditions and inhumane treatment). 
65 Lippman, supra note 62, at 324. 
66 See, e.g., United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), eert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); 
United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 
(8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), een. denied, 397 U.S. 910 
(1970); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968). 
67 Moylan, 417 F.2d at 1003. 
68 Id. at 1009. 
69 See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text. 
70 See, e.g., Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Crim. App.), een. denied, 580 So. 2d 
1390 (Ala. 1991); People v. Garziano, 281 Cal. Rptr. 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), een. denied, 112 
S.Ct. 659 (1991); State v. Anthony, 588 A.2d 214 (Conn. App. Ct.), eert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 312 
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volvement in Central America,71 corporate investments in South M-
rica,72 homelessness,73 reduced funding for AIDS research,74 logging 
practices in the Pacific Northwest,75 animal rights,76 and auto emis-
sions pollution.77 
Necessity remains a common law defense in some states, while in 
many others it is codified.78 Though the required elements of the 
defense vary among states, virtually every court's interpretation of it 
includes some variation of the following definitions: (1) the actor has 
acted to avoid a significant evil; (2) there are no adequate legal means 
to escape the evil; and (3) the actor's chosen remedy is not dispropor-
tionate to the evil sought to be avoided.79 One common formulation 
(1991); Hoover v. State, 402 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Kettering v. Berry, 567 N.E.2d 316 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990); State v. Clowes, 801 P.2d 789 (Or. 1990); People v. Crowley, 538 N.Y.S.2d 
146 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1989); Crabb v. State, 754 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), eert. denied, 493 
U.S. 815 (1989); Buckley v. Falls Church, 371 S.E.2d 827 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Sigma Reprod. 
Health Ctr. v. State, 467 A.2d 483 (Md. 1983); St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982); Cleveland v. Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981). 
71 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 585 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1991); State v. Cram, 600 A.2d 733 (Vt. 1991); 
People v. Scutari, 560 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1990); State v. Drummy, 557 A.2d 574 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). 
72 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 777 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 853 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 
1993). 
73 See, e.g., Shiel v. United States, 515 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1986), eert. denied,485 U.S. 1010 (1988); 
Griffin v. United States, 447 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982), eert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983). 
74 See, e.g., People v. Alderson, 540 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989). 
76 See, e.g., State v. Hund, 708 P.2d 621 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 713 P.2d 1058 (Or. 
1986). 
76 See, e.g., State v. Troen, 786 P.2d 751 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 801 P.2d 841 (Or. 1990), 
and eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2857 (1991). 
77 See, e.g., People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
78 See, e.g., Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 (1993); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 
(Michie 1993); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-702 (1993); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 463 (1993); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(5) and (6) (Michie 1993); Hawaii: HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 703-302 (1993); Illinois: S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/7-13 (1993); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1993); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:3-2 (West 1992); New York: N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 35.05 (MicKinney 1987); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-{)1 (1993); 
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 161.200 (1991); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 503 (1993); Utah: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401 (1993); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 939.47 (1991-92). 
79 Arnolds & Garland, supra note 50, at 294; Schulkind, supra note 1, at 82. Some versions of 
the necessity defense are derived from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 3.02, 
which states in relevant part that: 
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself 
or to another is justifiable, provided that: 
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought 
to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and 
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses 
dealing with the specific situations involved; and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly 
appear. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). 
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requires that defendants establish four conjunctive elements before 
a court will permit the defense: 
(1) the defendants were faced with a choice of evils and chose the 
lesser evil; 
(2) they acted to prevent imminent harm; 
(3) they reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship be-
tween their conduct and the harm to be averted; and 
(4) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law.so 
Additionally, many states have adopted a requirement found in the 
Model Penal Code that disallows the necessity defense where the 
legislature has already spoken and sanctions the particular activity 
that the defendants protested.81 For example, because Congress has 
authorized the production and use of nuclear power, a defendant who 
is arrested for protesting the hazards associated with nuclear power 
cannot appeal to the necessity defense to justify his actions.82 
III. APPLICATION OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE TO MILITARY 
PROTESTS 
Courts frequently refuse to grant a jury instruction on the neces-
sity defense in civil resistance cases.83 Although the Constitution ac-
cords criminal defendants the right to due process and to present a 
full defense,84 the defendant first possesses the burden of presenting 
enough evidence to warrant an instruction on the defense.85 In apply-
80 United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1992). 
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(c) (1985). 
82 See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. 
83 Courts permitted the necessity defense in two reported civil resistance cases. See People 
v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991); People v. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. City 
Ct. 1988). In People v. Archer, an abortion clinic protest case, the New York City Court 
permitted an instruction on the necessity defense provided that the defendants first were able 
to establish that abortions were being performed at a clinic beyond the first trimester. 537 
N.Y.S.2d at 735. In People v. Gray, the court permitted the necessity defense and acquitted 
individuals who blocked a vehicle lane on a bridge to protest increasing vehicular pollution. 571 
N.Y.S.2d at 863. The lane previously was open for pedestrians and cyclists, but subsequently 
was converted into a vehicle lane. [d. at 853. 
The Pennsylvania Court of Appeals twice permitted the necessity defense in separate nuclear 
power plant protest actions, however both cases were reversed by the state supreme court. See 
Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d 1099 (Pa. Super. 1984), rev'd, 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985); 
Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. 1984), rev'd, 498 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985). 
84 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1972) ("[t]he right of an accused in a criminal 
trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations"). 
85 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,411 (1980). The Court stated, "it is essential that the 
testimony given or proffered meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so 
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ing the elements of the necessity defense to a particular act of civil 
resistance, courts frequently conclude that the defendant has not 
produced evidence sufficient to satisfy each element of the defense. 
For example, a defendant may proffer enough evidence to demon-
strate an imminent harm and a causal nexus between the action taken 
and averting the harm, but fail to demonstrate that no legal alterna-
tives to protesting existed.86 Consequently, the court will not permit 
a jury instruction and the necessity defense will be prohibited. 
Despite courts' reluctance to permit the necessity defense in civil 
resistance cases, the military's contamination crisis involves unique 
circumstances that should historically have enabled civil resistance 
protesters to meet each required element of the defense. An analysis 
of the key elements of the necessity defense and of the DOD's and the 
DOE's handling of its wastes reveals that: (1) DOD and DOE facilities 
across the country created an imminent harm to human health and 
the environment that was not legislatively sanctioned so as to pre-
empt civil resistance defendants' justification for protesting;87 (2) the 
alarmed citizens who committed acts of civil resistance at these facili-
ties could demonstrate a causal nexus between their protest activity 
and the harm to be averted;88 and (3) the DOD's and the DOE's past 
ability to circumvent environmental laws and eschew accountability 
for their contamination problems prompted non-violent civil resis-
tance protests as the only practical source of public recourse.89 
A. Imminent Harm 
The necessity defense frequently requires that defendants estab-
lish that the harm they averted was imminent.90 Courts assert that 
an imminent harm must be actually present or immediate.91 The harm 
also must be tangible and measurable, for harms that are forthcoming 
that, if a jury finds it to be true, it could support an affirmative defense-here, that of duress 
or necessity." [d. 
86 See infra notes 234-51 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra notes 196-216 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 228--133 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 315--131 and accompanying text. 
90 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1987) (necessity defense available when 
"[s]uch conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private 
injury which is about to occur"); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(necessity defense requires that defendants show "they acted to prevent imminent harm"), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Brodhead, 714 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Mass. 1989) 
(defendants must be able to show that they reasonably believed their action was necessary to 
avoid imminent threatened harm). 
91 See LAF AVE & SeOTI, supra note 42, § 5.4, at 639. 
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and opaque will not satisfy the imminence requirement.92 In People v. 
Gray, one of the few reported cases which has permitted the necessity 
defense, the defendant protesters successfully established an immi-
nent harm.93 There, the state charged the defendants with disorderly 
conduct when they blocked a traffic lane of a bridge in New York 
City.94 The defendants were protesting a Department of Transporta-
tion regulation which opened a lane normally reserved for bicycles 
and pedestrians to automobiles during rush hour traffic.95 The defen-
dants introduced testimony and studies demonstrating that motor 
vehicle pollution causes lung, respiratory tract and heart disease, as 
well as cancer risks from exposure to air toxics.96 Accordingly, aNew 
York state criminal court asserted that, unlike many necessity de-
fense cases where the harm sought to be avoided was too remote to 
be deemed imminent, "the grave harm in this case is occurring every 
day."97 The court noted further that New York City's failure to attain 
the EPA's minimum standards for air pollution meant that it would 
have to reduce vehicular traffic in order to attain these standards.98 
In most cases, however, the defendant protesters fail to establish 
an imminent harm. For example, in State v. Warshow,99 a group of 
nuclear power demonstrators were arrested for peacefully blocking 
the main gate of a temporarily closed nuclear power plant in order to 
deny access to workers who were repairing and refueling the facil-
ity.100 At trial, the protesters attempted to assert the necessity de-
fense. 101 They urged that the power plant posed an immediate hazard 
because it emitted low-level radiation and created dangerous nuclear 
waste.102 The trial court denied the defense, and the defendants were 
convicted.103 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
92 See infra notes 105--D9, 114-15 and accompanying text. 
93 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
!)j [d. at 852. 
95 [d. at 853, 857. 
96 See id. at 85 7. 
97 [d. at 858. 
98 [d. at 857. The court's acknowledgement that New York City was not meeting the EPA's 
air pollution standards implicitly suggests that imminent harms can be tied to compliance with 
the law, so that a failure to comply with the law itself evidences that a harm is occurring. This 
observation is significant in terms of the military's problems because the military also has failed 
to comply with hazardous waste laws and thus has created imminent harms. See infra notes 
136-95, 212 and accompanying text. 
99 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979). 
100 [d. at 1001. 
101 [d. 
102 [d. at 1002. 
103 [d. at 1001. 
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decision, holding that "low-level radiation and nuclear waste are not 
the types of imminent danger classified as an emergency sufficient to 
justify criminal activity."lll4 The court defined "imminence" as a danger 
that "must be, or must reasonabl[y] appear to be, threatening to occur 
immediately, near at hand, and impending."105 Consequently, the de-
fendants' reference to long-range risks and dangers did not ade-
quately demonstrate an imminent or present threat to health and 
safety.l06 The court added, "[ w ]here the hazards are long term, the 
danger is not imminent, because the defendants have time to exercise 
options other than breaking the law."l()7 The Texas Court of Appeals 
also applied this reasoning in affirming the conviction of a defendant 
who chained himself to the front door of a utility because he feared 
the emission of low-level radiation from a nuclear power plant about 
to commence operations later that year. lOS The court held that the 
defendant's fear of something which was to take place at a later date 
would not constitute a reasonable belief that his action was immedi-
ately necessary to avoid imminent harm.109 
Similarly, in many of the nuclear weapons protest cases, courts 
rejected the defendants' request for a jury instruction on the neces-
sity defense where the defendants asserted that their actions were 
necessary to avoid an accidental or intentional nuclear warYO In Peo-
ple v. Weber, the defendants blocked sidewalks and streets in front of 
General Dynamics and a U.S. Navy submarine base, decreeing that 
their behavior was necessary to prevent a nuclear war.1l1 The appeals 
division of a California superior court maintained that the apprehen-
104 [d. 
1(1; [d. See also Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d 806, 809 (Pa. 1985) (',[t]o be imminent, 
the danger must be, or must reasonably appear to be, threatening to occur immediately, near 
at hand, and impending"). See also United States v. Seward, where the Tenth Circuit emphasized 
that: 
The defense of necessity does not arise from a "choice" of several courses of action, it 
is instead based on a real emergency. It can be asserted only by a defendant who was 
confronted with such a crisis as a personal danger, a crisis which did not permit a 
selection from among several solutions, some of which did not involve criminal acts. 
687 F.2d 1270, 1276 (lOth Cir. 1982), eert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983). 
100 State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Vt. 1979). 
HI7 [d. The defendants argued further that their action was necessary to prevent a nuclear 
accident. [d. Again, the court rejected the defendants' contention, asserting that "the spectre 
of nuclear accident [does not] fulfill the imminent and compelling harm element of the defense 
.... [The defendants] claimed that they acted to foreclose the 'chance' or 'possibility' of [an] 
accident. This defense cannot lightly be allowed to justify acts taken to foreclose speculative 
and uncertain dangers." [d. 
100 Schermbeck v. State, 690 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
109 [d. at 317. 
110 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 230 (Pa. 1985). 
111 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984). 
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sion of a nuclear holocaust is not sufficient to establish imminence.l12 
The court stated that the necessity defense must be "articulable to an 
immediate, imminent fear and compulsion."u3 Protesters also failed to 
establish an imminent danger in Andrews v. People, following their 
arrest for obstructing a roadway leading to the Rocky Flats nuclear 
weapons plant in Colorado.u4 In response to the protesters' contention 
that the plant emitted radiotoxic pollutants which threatened human 
health and the environment, and that its manufacture of plutonium 
triggers increased the risk of nuclear war, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held that the dangers were "long-term and speCUlative, and 
thus insufficient to demonstrate that a specific, definite, and imminent 
injury is about to occur."U5 Similarly, in State v. Dansinger, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine held that protesters at a National 
Guard base failed to prove imminence where they feared the immi-
nent physical harm of a nuclear war.U6 The court determined that the 
defendants' subjective fears alone were not sufficient to establish 
imminence; rather, it must be shown as a fact that such a threat 
existed.ll7 
In addition to the above requirements, if a legislature has deter-
mined that engaging in a particular activity does not constitute a 
harm, or it has made a deliberate legislative choice to accept the harm 
resulting from that activity, the civil resistance defendant cannot 
invoke the necessity defense.u8 If the legislature has made such a 
choice, "its decision governs."U9 In State v. Dorsey, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court denied the necessity defense to nuclear power 
112 [d. at 721. 
113 [d. See also United States v. Brodhead, 714 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Mass. 1989) (threat of 
nuclear war sought to be avoided by defendant protesters insufficient to establish imminency). 
114 800 P.2d 607, 611 (Colo. 1990). 
115 [d. 
116 521 A.2d 685, 688 (Me. 1987). 
117 [d. 
118 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(c) (1985). Most state codes include some version of the 
legislative preemption provision in the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
702 (1993) (necessity defense available ''unless inconsistent with ... some other provision of 
law"); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:3-2 (West 1992) (necessity defense available if "a legislative purpose 
to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear''). The common law 
necessity defense formulas, similarly, address legislative preemption. See, e.g., State v. War-
show, where the concurring justice noted: 
... the availability of the defense of necessity is precluded ... when there has been 
a deliberate legislative choice as to the values at issue. The common law defense of 
necessity deals with imminent dangers from obvious and generally recognized harms. 
It does not deal with non-imminent or debatable harms, nor does it deal with activities 
that the legislative branch has expressly sanctioned and found not to be harms. 
410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Vt. 1979) (citations omitted). 
119 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 42, § 5.4, at 629. 
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protesters because the State of New Hampshire and the United 
States Congress have made deliberate choices in favor of the use of 
nuclear power. 120 The court held "it is inconceivable that the legisla-
ture would intend that nuclear power be considered such a harm as 
to justify individuals in breaking the law. We are confident that it was 
not intended that such matters be included within the scope [of the 
necessity defense statuteJ."121 
Moreover, even if a legislative policy is deemed "unwise," courts 
find that civil disobedience is not the proper course for expressing 
dissension.122 In State v. Diener, the Missouri Court of Appeals barred 
the necessity defense in a criminal prosecution for nuclear weapons 
protesters charged with trespass.123 The court held that the necessity 
defense is not available to individuals who deliberately violate the law 
to express disagreement with national defense policies already ra-
tified by elected representatives.124 
Legislative policies and decisions do not preempt all acts of civil 
disobedience or civil resistance, however. In People v. Gray, the court 
acknowledged that the defendants' protests against vehicular pollu-
tion were consonant with the legislature's goal to eliminate air pollution 
and its accompanying dangers.125 Thus, unlike the many cases con-
cerning protests against nuclear power and nuclear weapons where 
courts have implied a legislative choice in favor of these activities, and 
thus preempted the necessity defense, the protesters in Gray were 
not preempted.126 Because their protest activity did not contravene 
legislative policy, but rather promoted the legislature's goals, legisla-
tive preemption did not foreclose the defendants' opportunity to raise 
the necessity defense. 127 
100 395 A.2d 855, 857 (N.H. 1978). 
1211d. See State v. Greene, where the Kansas Court of Appeals stated: 
The legislature has established a statutory scheme for the development and use of 
nuclear power. If the [necessity] defense were available to those who disagree with 
that policy ... [t]hat result would transfer from the legislature to random groups of 
citizens the task of weighing nuclear power's benefits against its potential for harm 
.... We are not concerned with the wisdom of the present legislative policy on the 
subject; we do conclude that such a policy decision is for the people's elected repre-
sentatives and not for jurors in individual cases. 
623 P.2d 933, 936 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). 
122 In re Weller, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
122 706 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo. App. 1986). 
124 ld. 
125 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 856 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). The court noted that the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970 required the EPA to promulgate "clean air" standards. ld. at 856 n.2. It 
added further that New York did not, and has never satisfied the EPA's minimum standards. 
ld. 
126 ld. at 856. 
127 ld. 
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Finally, some courts have noted that harms generated from human 
sources must be illegal to justify acts of protest.128 In Allison v. 
Birmingham, for example, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 
rejected abortion protesters' assertions that necessity demanded they 
block the entrance to an abortion clinic.129 The court stated that when 
a human, rather than a natural source generates the harm to be 
avoided, the harm must be unlawful to invoke properly the necessity 
defense.13o The court noted, therefore, "because abortion is legal, the 
harm sought to be avoided is not unlawful and, thus, the greater harm 
is the trespass."13l Similarly, in St. Louis v. Klocker, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals denied the necessity defense to a group of abortion 
protesters who blocked access to a clinic's abortion procedure 
rooms.l32 The court explained that the necessity defense requires that 
the defendants acted to avoid an "imminent public or private injury," 
and it determined that no such injury was occurring at the clinic.133 It 
stated, "[s]ince abortions, like those in issue here, are constitutionally 
protected activity, and, therefore, legal, their occurrence cannot be a 
public or private injury."l34 Accordingly, the court held that the defen-
dants' necessity defense claim must fail because it was "inconsistent 
with other provisions of law."135 
1. Imminent Harms and the United States Military 
a. Department of Defense Installations 
In 1982, a neighborhood boy brought a live, unexploded grenade 
into his school for "show and tell," jolting into action residents of four 
towns adjacent to the Massachusetts Military Reservation in western 
Cape Cod.l36 The child found the grenade on the beach, in one of the 
many areas at the defense installation that were not fenced-in.137 The 
128 See, e.g., Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377, 1380--81 (Ala. Crim. App.), em. denied, 
580 So. 2d 1390 (Ala. 1991); St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
129 Allison, 580 So. 2d at 1379, 1389. 
130 I d. at 1380--8 l. 
131 I d. at 138l. 
132 637 S.W.2d at 175. 
1331d. at 176. 
1341d. at 177. 
1351d. See also State v. Clarke, 590 A.2d 468, 468 (Conn. App. Ct.) (because the harm of 
abortion is not a recognized injury under the law, the defense of necessity is insufficient as a 
matter of law), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 135 (Conn. 1991); People v. Crowley, 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 
149 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1989) (because abortion is legal and constitutionally protected, defendants 
had no standing to argue that they were preventing an imminent "public or private injury"). 
136 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 147. 
1371d. 
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live grenade was merely a sign of much larger problems at the 22,000-
acre military reservation, where pollution has occurred since the late 
1970s.138 Truck, airplane, and jet fuels, cleaning solvents, and waste oil 
represent only a few of the many toxins which the installation re-
leased into the environment.139 A military funded environmental study 
identified forty-two hazardous waste sites present at the installa-
tion.140 Other estimates have revealed that base personnel released 
approximately six million gallons of aviation fuel into the sand while 
testing airplanes' automatic fuel release mechanisms.l4l Collectively, 
these releases created at least eight toxic plumes,142 some two miles 
long and a half-mile wide, which seeped from the base into an aquifer 
which supplies Cape residents with their drinking water.143 Ulti-
mately, in the five communities which surround the base, the com-
bined cancer rate rose steadily to thirty percent above the state 
average from 1982 to 1989.144 Moreover, two cities, Falmouth and 
Bourne, revealed lung cancer and leukemia cases at seventy-nine 
percent and seventy-two percent higher than the state average, as 
well as increases in colo-rectal, breast and bladder cancers.145 
Cape Cod is representative of thousands of DOD sites scattered 
throughout virtually every state146 which demonstrate a history of 
environmental violations and compliance problems. The DOD's trans-
gressions have been documented extensively, revealing the enormous 
imminent harm that its contamination has presented to the public and 
to the environment.147 For example, In Lakehurst, New Jersey, the 
DOD's Naval Engineering Center rests just north of the New Jersey 
Pinelands Preservation Area, a sprawling one million acre Pine Bar-
138 Jeff McLaughlin, The Cape Raises its Voice; Residents Express Worries on Environment, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1991, at 46. 
139 Jeff McLaughlin, Upper Cape Cancer Rate Continuing to Soar, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 
1990, at 36. 
140 Michael Satchell, Uncle Sam's 1bxic Folly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1989, at 
20. 
141 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 148. 
142 McLaughlin, supra note 138. 
143 Satchell, supra note 140. 
144 [d. 
145 [d. 
146 NGAINAAG REPORT, supra note 4, at inside cover. The Armed Forces' installations 
subsume 25.6 million acres of land across the United States, resting in such disparate areas as 
the rural plains of Nebraska, and urban centers such as Watertown, Massachusetts, a city 
adjacent to Boston. See Van Voorst, supra note 16. See also SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 74, 
157. 
147 See Seth Shulman's book, supra note 15, for a thorough discussion of the DOD's pollution 
problems. 
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rens forest reserve.148 Beneath this forest flows the Cohansey aquifer, 
the largest source of fresh water in the Northeast.149 The Lakehurst 
installation exists as a key location for the research and development 
of Navy aircraft, however the EPA also ranks it among the nation's 
most polluted waste sites.l50 Investigations have revealed that past 
releases of three million gallons of aviation and jet fuels and other 
hazardous wastes contributed to the pollution problems at Lake-
hurst. l5l At a nearby parachute jump site, Navy officials determined 
that between 1950 and 1970, the Navy dumped approximately two 
million gallons of aviation fuel into the soiU52 Now officials fear that 
such practices have contaminated the aquifer.153 The EPA already 
concluded in 1983 that water at the base itself was contaminated and 
presents an immediate threat to human health.l54 
In Jacksonville, Arkansas, similarly, the Little Rock Air Force Base 
poisoned the environment and threatened public health through its 
manufacturing of herbicides such as Agent Orange, which was 
sprayed by United States forces in Vietnam.l55 Operations at an on-
site chemical plant, which sits "smack dab in the middle of a middle-
class neighborhood,"I56 generated toxic byproducts such as dioxin 
which polluted Jacksonville's backyards, creeks, school grounds, and 
drinking water.157 EPA studies conducted since 1979 revealed that 
dioxin concentrations in soil samples taken from residential neighbor-
hoods adjacent to the site were 200 times more concentrated than 
those of a city in Missouri which the EPA ordered evacuated.l58 One 
resident described her yard: "'[f]lowers smell funny, blades of grass 
148 [d. at 63. 
149 [d. The aquifer stores more than seventeen trillion gallons of fresh water, and is believed 
to be one of the largest groundwater suppliers in the country. [d. The entire southern New 
Jersey population relies on the Cohansey aquifer for its drinking water. [d. at 64. 
150 [d. 
151 Leo H. Carney, Flario Assails Military's Dumping, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 11, 1985, at 
1. 
152 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 67. The fuel was dumped into the soil to "rid the parachute 
jump site of grass and other vegetation so it could be easily spotted from the air." [d. at 68. 
153 Carney, supra note 151. Time Magazine also reported in 1992 that a plume of contaminated 
TCE solvent water "is leaking into the aquifer that supplies water to the southern part of the 
state." Van Voorst, supra note 16. 
154 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 70--71. 
155 NTCF REPORT, supra note 3, at 43. The manufacturing of these herbicides ceased in 1986. 
[d. 
156 Primetime Live (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 11, 1990). 
157 NTCF REPORT, supra note 3, at 43. 
158 Liane Clorfene Casten, While the E.P.A. Fiddles: A Town is Being Poisoned, 246 NATION 
11, Mar. 19, 1988, at 370. 
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turn red, and the funniest-looking mushrooms you ever saw."'159 To-
day, the lethal results of such contamination is reflected by the health 
of Jacksonville's residents. Many suffer from a variety of illnesses 
apparently caused by the contamination.1OO 
Finally, in Grand Island, Nebraska, the city's 33,000 residents have 
been threatened by the release of toxics at the U.S. Army's Cornhus-
ker Ammunition Plant.161 The plant opened in 1942 and was a site 
where explosives were packed into one thousand pound bombs as well 
as smaller munitionsYi2 Every week, workers underwent cleansing 
procedures that washed away large quantities of toxic, explosive dust 
into a network of over fifty cesspools and leaching pitsY» At the 
installation's laundry, contaminated wastewater from the workers' 
clothing flowed into an underground sump, where burlap-like sacks 
collected silty explosive residue, then were removed and ignited.164 
Although the Army contended publicly that all the contaminated 
cleaning water would not migrate from the base/55 internal reports 
revealed that "'significant levels of [explosive chemicals] exist in the 
groundwater,'" and that the Army "had strong reason to suspect that 
the chemicals had migrated beyond the installation's boundaries."166 
In fact, estimates indicated that ''the contaminated groundwater could 
be migrating toward the city by as much as three meters per day."167 
Four years after the Army first suspected that off-base migration was 
occurring, the Army finally divulged publicly that extremely high 
levels of a toxic chemical called RDX appeared in over half of the 467 
159 Paul Hoversten, 'We've Been Human Guinea Pigs'/ Ark. Town Fights 7bxic Waste Tests, 
USA ToDAY, Nov. 13, 1992, at 4A. 
100 See Scott Charton, Arkansas Waiting for EPA to Clean Up 'Priority' Waste Sites, Los 
ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 22, 1989, at 6. For example, one resident who swam in a lake contaminated 
with "orange foam that lathered its banks," and ate fish and rabbits presumably contaminated 
by the chemical plant, suffers from a paralytic left arm, trembling hands, asthma, allergies and 
chronic headaches. [d. In another case, a three-month-old baby died from what an initial autopsy 
revealed as sudden infant death syndrome. Primetime Live (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 11, 
1990). Tests conducted later indicated the presence of toxic chemicals in the child's liver and 
kidneys which the child's parents conclude he ingested when his baby formula was mixed with 
contaminated tap water. [d. Furthermore, a biochemist's 1986 study revealed that between 1980 
and 1982, Jacksonville exhibited a higher rate of miscarriages and stillbirths than the national 
average. Casten, supra note 158. 
161 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 75. 
162 [d. 
163 [d. at 76. 
164 [d. 
166 See id. at 77. 
166 [d. 
167 [d. 
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private, residential wells it tested in the vicinity of Grand Island.l68 
One Grand Island citizen who lived near the plant and feared for his 
own and his family's health attempted to sell his house.169 Ultimately, 
when no one would buy it and the Army wouldn't compensate him for 
it, he had to declare bankruptcy and abandon the home.17o 
b. Department of Energy Facilities 
The Hanford Nuclear Reservation, located in southeastern Wash-
ington, commenced operations in 1943 as a top-secret installation 
charged with manufacturing material for the Manhattan Project's 
atom bomb.l71 Throughout its history, the facility released more than 
200 billion gallons of hazardous wastes into unlined pits and lagoons.l72 
Additionally, workers pumped at least 127 million gallons of radioac-
tive liquids directly into the ground.173 The long-term effects of this 
discharge on soil and groundwater still are unclear, however at least 
230 square miles of the site are contaminated.174 Moreover, an esti-
mated 200 square miles of groundwater are poisoned, and "chemical 
concentrations exceed drinking water standards by several orders of 
magnitude."175 The facility also released radiation over the years into 
the nearby Columbia River, which reached the Pacific Ocean 200 
hundred miles away.176 Fish and drinking water along the river were 
contaminated, and as many as 2,000 people were exposed to poten-
tially dangerous doses of radiation. 177 Currently, 177 waste tanks filled 
with millions of gallons of radioactive waste and toxic chemicals left 
over from the production of plutonium pose the danger of a cata-
strophic explosion; the DOE, however, still does not know what is in 
the tanks, or just how dangerous they are.178 As of 1990, sixty-five of 
these tanks had leaked,179 and one of them released approximately 
7,500 gallons of deadly radioactive waste, "raising serious questions 
168 [d. at 78. 
169 [d. at 74. 
170 [d. at 74-75. 
171 [d. at 94. 
172 Satchell, supra note 140. 
173 Matthew L. Wald, Wider Peril Seen in Nuclear Waste from Bomb Making, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at AI. 
174 [d.; NGAINAAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. 
175 Hanford Bedeviled by Contamination of Groundwater, 5 ENVIRONMENT WEEK 32 (1992). 
176 Radiation Flowed 200 Miles to Sea, Study Finds, NEW YORK TIMES, July 17, 1992, at 2I. 
177 [d. 
178 Matthew Wald, Hazards at Nuclear Plant Fester 8 Years After Warnings, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at AI. 
179 NGAINAAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. 
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about the success of efforts to improve safety of the storage of waste 
from the production of nuclear weapons."180 In total, the DOE esti-
mates that 500,000 gallons of liquid radioactive waste have seeped 
from the tanks into the ground.181 
Hanford is just one facility of the DOE's nuclear weapons "indus-
trial empire"182 that over the past forty-five years has saturated the 
environment with toxic chemicals and radioactive wastes.183 Specific 
data concerning each weapons facility reveals the enormous harms 
facing the public and the environment. In southwestern Ohio, for 
example, people live next to a hazardous waste and radioactive waste 
dump comprised of solvents, radioactively contaminated PCBs and 
radionuclides such as uranium, thorium and plutonium.184 Additionally, 
hundreds of thousands of pounds of deadly wastes are buried in leaky 
pits above an aquifer which provides the second largest source of 
drinking water for the State of Ohio.l85 This legacy of radioactive and 
hazardous waste contamination originated at the DOE's Feed and 
Materials Production Centerl86 near Fernald, Ohio, where the DOE 
has admitted in hearings that it knowingly consented to the release 
of hundreds of thousands of pounds of hazardous and radioactive 
substances into the air and water.187 In addition, discovery documents 
obtained in a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General of Ohio against 
the DOE revealed that the liners in a waste pit which contained 
radioactive wastewater developed tears on at least three occasions, 
100 Nuclear Waste Reportedly Leaking at U.S. Site in Washington State, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 
1993, at 20. 
181 Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, WIst 
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings 1989] (statement of Kenneth O. Eikenberry, 
Attorney General, State of Washington). 
182 OTA REPORT, supra note 10, at 3. The 14 major facilities which comprise the DOE nuclear 
weapons complex are located throughout thirteen states, sprawling across 3,350 square miles 
and employing over 100,000 people. ld. at 15. To put the size of the weapons facilities into 
perspective, OTA reports that the Nevada Test Site covers an area larger than the state of 
Rhode Island, while the Oak Ridge Reservation (Tennessee), Sandia National Laboratory (N ew 
Mexico), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico) each occupy an area approximately 
the size of Washington, DC. ld. at 15 n.2. 
183 ld. at 3. 
184 Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 48. PCBs, or polychlorinated biphenyls, are a family of 
chemicals that are probable cancer inducing carcinogens. See SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 203, 
208. See supra note 10 for the definition of "radionuclides." 
185 Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 48. 
186 ld. The Fernald plant converts uranium into uranium fuel for nuclear weapons production. 
Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 
(1987) [hereinafter Hearing 1987]. 
187 Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 48. 
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creating the likely possibility that the wastewater seeped into neigh-
boring groundwater.188 Further documentation has revealed that the 
DOE installed a radioactive wastewater pit in an abandoned well 
which had never been sealed, creating an even greater likelihood that 
the water escaped.189 Meanwhile, groundwater in private wells be-
came contaminated with radioactive pollution when rains washed ura-
nium off buildings and seeped into the soilYJ() The situation in Fernald 
is so dire that the EPA concluded that public health and welfare and 
the environment face "imminent and substantial endangerment" due 
to the past release and potential release of more hazardous sub-
stances.191 
Similarly, at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, workers 
dumped several hundred thousand gallons of toxic, radioactive waste 
daily in the Savannah River, contaminating water and wildlife.192 Can-
cer rates subsequently rose and a rare blood disease afflicted plant 
employees and nearby residents.l93 In addition, over time employees 
dumped approximately thirty million gallons of radioactive liquids 
into the ground, threatening the drinking water of surrounding com-
munities, including Atlanta, Georgia.194 Directly on site, levels of a 
radioactive carcinogen called strontium-90 were detected in surface 
water matching levels 43,000 times above federal government drink-
ing water standards.l95 
2. Imminent Harm Analysis 
The foregoing examples each share characteristics that satisfy the 
necessity defense's imminent harm requirement, for they speak to 
impending and unavoidable crises in communities across the United 
States. Whether its eight toxic plumes seeping into residents' drink-
ing water on Cape Cod,196 aquifers and wells in New Jersey,11n Ohio,198 
188 Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 89. 
189 [d. at 96-97. 
190 EPA Seeks Fines From Westinghouse for RCRA Violations at Fernald Plant, 19 ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) No. 42, Feb. 17, 1989, at 2255. 
191 Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 48. 
192John Freeman, Bitter Fruit of 'Building Bombs' Hard to Swallow, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Aug. 10, 1993, at E--8. 
193 [d. 
194 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 101. 
195 [d. 
196 Supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
197 Supra notes 151--54 and accompanying text. 
198 Supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. 
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and Nebraska199 threatened by the past releases of hazardous and 
radioactive waste, dioxin contamination throughout an entire Arkan-
sas community,200 or radioactive waste contaminating rivers in the 
Pacific northwest201 and Atlantic coast,202 nearly every military facility 
has presented an enormous harm to the public and to the environ-
ment. 
Unlike the cases where the threatened harm was long-term or 
speculative,203 or based upon defendants' subjective fears,204 the mili-
taris harm has been visibly evident, immediate, and profound.205 
Families have been forced to move,206 cancer rates have soared,207 
people feel ill and have developed rare diseases.208 Indeed, for many 
residents "the grave harm is ... occurring every day."209 The military, 
moreover, has conceded that its past practices contaminated the en-
vironment,210 while the EPA has acknowledged the threat these sites 
present to human health.211 Additionally, just as the court in People v. 
Gray suggested that New York's failure to comply with EPA air 
pollution standards created an imminent harm, the militaris failure 
to comply with hazardous waste laws also suggests that an imminent 
harm has occurred.212 
These harms, furthermore, are not the type that legislative pre-
emption shields from protest activities.213 Though Congress sanctions 
military activities and has made a legislative choice in favor of devel-
oping our nation's defense, it also created environmental laws in-
tended to protect human health and the environment.214 Therefore, 
199 Supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
200 Supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text. 
201 Supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
202 Supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
2(ll See Andrews v. People, 800 P.2d 607, 611 (Colo. 1990); State v. Wars how, 410 A.2d 1000, 
1002 (Vt. 1979). 
204 See State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 688 (Me. 1987). 
205 Compare People v. Weber, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 721 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984) 
(necessity defense must be "articulable to an immediate, imminent fear and compulsion"). 
206 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 144--45, 193 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 160, 193 and accompanying text. 
209 People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 858 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
210 See supra notes 140-41, 152, 166-B8, 187 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 158, 191 and accompanying text. 
212 Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 856 n.2. 
213 See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. 
214 See, e.g., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. III 
1991); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
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the legislature has not preempted protesters from demonstrating 
against these harms. Rather, as in People v. Gray, the goals of these 
protests are consistent with the legislature's goal of military compli-
ance with environmentallaws.215 Additionally, the military's unlawful 
pollution activities satisfy those jurisdictions which require that the 
harm from human sources be illegal, for the DOD's and the DOE's 
improper storage and disposal of these wastes has patently violated 
environmental laws such as RCRA.216 
B. Causal Relationship 
Courts reject the application of the necessity defense where defen-
dants fail to establish a causal nexus between their actions and the 
termination or abatement of the harm sought to be avoided.217 For 
example, in United States v. Simpson, a group of Vietnam war pro-
testers were arrested for attempting to destroy selective service 
records.218 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
stated that the necessity defense requires that "a direct causal rela-
tionship be reasonably anticipated to exist between the defender's 
action and the avoidance of harm."219 In denying the defendants the 
necessity defense, the court noted that "[t]he Vietnamese conflict 
could obviously have continued whether or not the San Jose, Califor-
nia draft board was able to restore its files and continue its lawful 
operation."220 
'IYPically, the causal relationship requirement is rigid and unattain-
able. For example, in United States v. Seward, a group of nuclear 
weapons protesters blocked a roadway leading to the Rocky Flats 
215 571 N. Y.S.2d at 856; supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. See infra notes 256-67 
and accompanying text. 
216 See Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377, 1380-81 (Ala. Crim. App.), een. denied, 580 So. 
2d 1390 (1991). See supra notes 136-95 and accompanying text. One individual remarked con-
cerning the Navy's Lakehurst installation, "If Lakehurst had been a[n] individual rather than 
a military installation, it would be called a criminal, a midnight dumper, and there would be 
action to put the person in prison." Carney, supra note 151. 
217 United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1972). 
218 [d. at 518. 
219 [d. 
220 [d. at 518 n.7. See also State v. Marley, where the Supreme Court of Hawaii denied the 
necessity defense to a group of protesters who trespassed upon the Honolulu office of the 
Honeywell Corporation, a major U.S. defense contractor, and disrupted the office through 
various non-violent protest activities. 509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973). The Supreme Court held that 
"[u]nder any possible set of hypotheses, the defendants could foresee that their actions would 
fail to halt Honeywell's production of the war material [produced by Honeywell] .... " [d. at 
1109. 
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nuclear weapons plant.221 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the necessity defense, explained that the 
defendant must show that "a reasonable man would think that block-
ing entry to Rocky Flats for one day would terminate the official 
policy of the United States government as to nuclear weapons or 
nuclear power."222 Similarly, in Comrrwnwealth v. Averill, the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court denied the necessity defense to a group of 
nuclear power protesters who were arrested when they refused to 
leave a private park adjacent to a nuclear power plant.223 The court 
held that the necessity defense requires that the individual reason-
ably anticipated a direct causal relationship between his act and the 
avoidance of the harm.224 It added that the protesters' actions only 
served to generate pUblicity, and that actions designed to galvanize 
public opinion could not eliminate an immediate harm.225 Additionally, 
in United States v. Dorrell, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction of a protester who entered 
a missile assembly plant intending to destroy MX missiles.226 The 
court held that the defendant failed as a matter of law to establish 
that his entry into the plant and his vandalism of military property 
"could be reasonably anticipated to lead to the termination of the MX 
missile program and the aversion of nuclear war and world starva-
tion."227 
1. Causal Relationship Analysis 
Individuals who have protested the pollution emanating from mili-
tary facilities could satisfy the necessity defense's causal relationship 
requirement because the object and the goals of their protest activity 
were narrower in scope than in other protest cases where defendants 
failed to establish a causal nexus. The case law reveals that defen-
dants could not establish a causal relationship between their protests 
and the avoidance of the harm presented because the objects of their 
protests were longstanding, firmly established government policies or 
221 687 F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983). 
222 ld. at 1273. 
223 423 N.E.2d 6, 7, 8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). 
224 ld. at 7. 
225 ld. at 7-8. 
200 758 F.2d 427, 435 (9th Cir. 1985). 
2Z7 ld. at 433. See also Andrews v. People, 800 P.2d 607, 610 (Colo. 1990) (defendants failed to 
prove that protest would bring about termination of DOE facility's production of nuclear 
weapons). 
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activities.228 In opposing an entire war,229 a power source,230 or the 
development of nuclear weapons,231 the prospect of an individual or 
group of individuals terminating that activity through an act of pro-
test is virtually nonexistent. Thus, these defendants could not suc-
cessfully propound that they reasonably anticipated their protest 
activity would reduce or eliminate the harm they sought to avoid. 
By contrast, the object of protest for military contamination dem-
onstrators has not been nuclear power or weapons development or 
the nation's defense policies and activities. Protesters instead have 
challenged the harmful contamination which results from these activi-
ties in their communities. In seeking to modify an individual facility's 
waste disposal practices rather than its policies or its production of 
weapons, citizens have reproached an activity that the legislature 
does not sanction or support. 
Under these circumstances, therefore, where the object of their 
demonstrations has been narrowly drawn, protesters have main-
tained a realistic chance of realizing their goals through civil resis-
tance. By calling attention to a specific facility's disposal practices and 
placing pressure upon that facility to alter its conduct, citizens could 
reasonably anticipate that their collective voices and tenacity would 
make the military reconsider its behavior. The OTA acknowledged, in 
fact, that one of the reasons for the current waste and contamination 
problems at DOE facilities is that the nuclear weapons complex has 
operated throughout this century without any external surveillance 
or meaningful public scrutiny.232 Additionally, one author concluded, 
"I am convinced that with increased public attention and, where 
necessary, public outcry, with vigilant community oversight and a 
concerted, determined effort to enforce the military's compliance with 
state and federal environmental laws ... my community may some-
day be able to reclaim its currently poisoned military land."233 
c. No Legal Alternatives 
Courts frequently deny the necessity defense to civil resistance 
defendants because they find that legal alternatives to the defendants' 
228 See supra notes 220, 222, 227 and accompanying text. 
229 United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1972). 
220 Commonwealth v. Averill, 423 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). 
221 United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Seward, 687 
F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983). 
2220TA REPORT, supra note 10, at 15. 
223 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 164. 
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actions existed.234 Though the necessity defense does not make law-
breaking legal, it does justify behavior where no legal recourse ex-
ists.235 However, iflegal alternatives to a particular course of behavior 
are present, defendants have no standing to raise the necessity de-
fense.236 Consequently, defendants' actions, irrespective of their rea-
sons for undertaking them, are indefensible. 
People v. Gray represents one of the few cases where defendants 
satisfied the "no legal alternatives" requirement.237 In exonerating 
protesters who blocked an automobile lane of a bridge which had 
previously been a cycling and pedestrian lane, a state criminal court 
acknowledged that New York City closed the cycling lane without 
advance warning or discussion with any of the public interest groups 
that regularly consulted with New York's Department of Transporta-
tionP8 The court also emphasized that the defendants pursued an 
exhaustive variety of avenues to reopen the lane, including formal 
written protests, letter writing and phone calling to Department of 
Transportation officials, petitions, requests to obtain a public hearing, 
and weekly demonstrations that involved walking or cycling across 
the outer roadway.239 The court thus held that the defendants lack of 
success in pursuing these alternatives satisfied the "no legal alterna-
tives" requirement, and justified their resort to nonlegal activity.240 
Few courts are persuaded by defendants' claims that they ex-
hausted every legal alternative, however. In United States v. Quilty, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit articu-
lated a narrow interpretation of the "no legal alternatives" require-
ment in denying the necessity defense to a group of nuclear weapons 
protesters.241 The court held that "[t]here are thousands of opportu-
nities for the propagation of the anti-nuclear message: in the nation's 
electoral process; by speech on public streets, in parks, in auditoriums, 
in churches and lecture halls; and by the release of information to the 
media, to name only a few."242 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Brug-
mann, the Massachusetts Appeals Court acknowledged the existence 
234 See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text. 
236 See Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (1966). 
236 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); Levitan, supra note 35, at 1231. 
237 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 862 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
238 [d. at 861-62. 
239 [d. at 861. 
240 [d. at 862. 
241741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984). 
242 [d. See also Commonwealth v. Hood, 452 N.E.2d 188, 196 (Mass. 1983) (defendants had legal 
alternatives to abate danger, such as use of publicity, media, distribution of literature at an 
appropriate site, and participation in the political process). 
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oflegal alternatives for a group of defendants who trespassed outside 
a nuclear power plant.243 The court held that defendants must make 
themselves aware of existing alternatives, or demonstrate that they 
are futile, in order to satisfy the requirement.244 
Courts have been unresponsive, furthermore, to arguments that 
defendants were unsuccessful when they appealed to the legislative 
process. For example, in United States v. Kabat, the defendants were 
convicted for trespassing and vandalizing missiles at a nuclear weap-
ons facility.245 Though the defendants asserted that other protest ac-
tivities and political efforts had been ineffectual in halting the nuclear 
arms buildup, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held that these failures did not justify violating the law.246 The 
court noted that "necessity" does not arise from defendants' own 
impatience with less visible and time consuming alternatives.247 It 
explained further that the necessity defense does not exist to excuse 
the conduct of individuals who oppose the legislature's decisions and 
policies, and that "a lack of results might mean only that the will of 
the majority, legitimately expressed, had prevailed."248 
Finally, courts also assert that citizens can appeal to the justice 
system to combat illegal harms, rather than resorting to civil resis-
tance.249 For example, in State v. Hund, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction of protesters who attempted to disrupt a 
corporation's allegedly illegal logging activities.250 The court noted 
that if the corporation's actions were illegal, a federal court main-
tained the authority to determine whether the corporation and the 
forest service violated any laws, and to stop the violations.251 
243 433 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
244Id. See also Griffin v. United States, 447 A.2d 776, 778 (D.C. 1982) (no necessity was present 
where homelessness protesters provided no evidence illustrating that they had checked out all 
other shelters before resorting to opening two cathedrals for homeless individuals), een. denied, 
461 U.S. 907 (1983). 
245 797 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1986), een. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987). 
246Id. at 591-92. 
247Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir. 1985». 
248Id. See also In re Weller, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (national defense 
policy is created through a political process to which the defendants had access; therefore, "[i]n 
a free society neither the political process nor the avenue of lawful protest is an exhaustible 
remedy for an unwise policy decision"). 
249 See, e.g., State v. Hund, 708 P.2d 621 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), eert. denied, 713 P.2d 1058 (Or. 
1986). 
250 I d. at 623. 
251Id. 
696 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:667 
1. No Legal Alternatives and Military Environmental Compliance 
Although courts have routinely determined that legal alternatives 
to protesters' actions existed, for years civil resistance at military 
facilities frequently was the public's only practical source of recourse 
for addressing and ameliorating the military's hazardous waste dis-
posal practices. Despite early congressional attempts to regulate fed-
eral facilities, the DOD and the DOE handily circumvented environ-
mental laws such as RCRA,252 while continuing to carpet the United 
States with toxic waste.253 Additionally, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) shielded federal facilities from EPA regulation 
by asserting that certain constitutional principles prohibit the EPA 
from regulating the military.254 Collectively, these impediments to 
ensuring meaningful environmental compliance by the DOD and the 
DOE perpetuated a crisis which often rendered citizen intervention 
the only reasonable means by which to address the military's pollution 
problems.255 
a. Federal Facility Compliance and the Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity 
In 1976 Congress enacted section 6001 of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA),256 a provision which sought to regu-
late the hazardous waste management activities of federal facilities 
from "cradle to grave."257 Section 6001 mandated that: 
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) 
having jurisdiction over any solid waste management facility or 
disposal site, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which 
may result, in the disposal or management of solid waste or haz-
ardous waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, 
State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and 
procedural ... respecting control and abatement of solid waste or 
hazardous waste disposal in the same manner, and to the same 
252 See infra notes 268--91 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 2-25, 136-95 and accompanying text. 
254 See infra notes 293--314 and accompanying text. 
255 See infra notes 315-31 and accompanying text. 
256 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 in order 
to develop a comprehensive national program for the regulation of hazardous and solid waste. 
RCRA directed the EPA to develop federal standards for ha2ardous waste management activi-
ties and to establish an EPA-administered permit program to implement those standards. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6925 (1988). States that obtained EPA authorization were permitted to admin-
ister their own comparable programs according to state law. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988). See 
Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 549-50. 
257 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988); FEDERAL LIABILITIES, supra note 14, at 11. 
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extent, as any person. . . . Neither the United States, nor any 
agent, employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt 
from any process or sanction of any State or Federal Court with 
respect to the enforcerrlent of any such injunctive relief.258 
One of the catalysts for the enactment of this provision was the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Hancock v. Train.259 In 
Hancock, the Court held that federal agencies were not required to 
obtain state air discharge permits pursuant to section 118 of the Clean 
Air ACt.260 Reasoning that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
forbids state regulation of government activities, the Court explained 
that states can regulate federal facilities only to the extent that Con-
gress explicitly and unambiguously authorizes such regulation.261 
In responding to the Hancock decision with the enactment of sec-
tion 6001 of RCRA, "Congress placed federal facilities on an equal 
footing with private companies, municipalities, state agencies and 
individuals who violated the provisions of RCRA."262 Federal facili-
ties' wastes, in theory, now were regulated under' RCRA in the same 
manner as other private individuals.263 Section 6001 subjected federal 
facilities to the various civil and criminal sanctions for RCRA viola-
tions-the EPA could issue administrative compliance orders and civil 
penalties for noncompliance with such orders,264 courts could assess 
civil and criminal penalties,265 and individuals could bring suit under 
RCRA's citizen suit provision.2OO Section 6001 thus directed the DOD 
and the DOE to comply with RCRA, and it provided a source of 
258 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988). 
259 426 U.S. 167 (1976). 
260 I d. at 180. 
261Id. at 178--79, cited in Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 555. The Court stated: 
Because of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding federal installations 
and activities from regulation by the States, an authorization of state regulation is 
found only when and to the extent there is "a clear congressional mandate," "specific 
congressional action" that makes this authorization of state regulation "clear and 
unambiguous." 
Id. See also EPA v. California ex reI. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 227 
(1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that states are barred from regulating 
federal facilities under the Clean Water Act. Moreover, the Court specifically noted that while 
the Clean Water Act required federal facilities to obtain EPA permits, the Act's definition of 
"person" did not include federal agencies, thus the EPA could not successfully issue compliance 
orders, bring civil actions, and levy civil penalties against agencies that failed to obtain EPA 
permits. See id. at 222 n.37. 
262 H.R. REP. No. 102-111, supra note 8, at 5. 
263 See Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 236-37 (statement of J. Winston Porter, Assistant 
Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency). 
264 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (c) (1988). 
265Id. § 6928(d)-(g). 
266Id. § 6972. 
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recourse for the government and the public against those facilities 
that refused to comply.267 
In reality, however, section 6001 did not provide the panacea for 
the military's compliance problems as initially contemplated by its 
language. Though Congress and the EPA maintained that facilities 
owned or operated by the federal government fell within the ambit of 
section 6001,268 the government asserted that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity shields it from section 6001 regulation.269 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits states and private 
parties from bringing actions against the federal government unless 
Congress explicitly and unambiguously waives its privilege against 
suitPO Premised upon the belief that the federal government needs 
267 DOE radioactive waste was not regulated under section 6001, however, and this gap in the 
regulations has allowed the DOE to dispose of its radioactive waste with impunity. The regula-
tory history of radioactive waste began in 1959, when Congress amended the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (AEA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), to include the regulation of 
three types of materials associated with radiation hazards: source, special nuclear, and bypro-
duct material. [d. § 2021. See Finamore, supra note 10, at 89--90. Though Congress' enactment 
of RCRA in 1976 created a comprehensive scheme of regulation concerning the management of 
hazardous waste, Congress specifically excluded "source," "special nuclear," and "byproduct 
material" from RCRA regulation in order to avoid overlap with the AEA. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6903(27) (1988); Finamore, supra note 10, at 93. The AEA thus retained exclusive authority 
over radioactive waste, while RCRA regulated nonradioactive waste. As of 1987, however, the 
DOE clarified that the hazardous portion of radioactive waste mixed with hazardous waste at 
its sites also is subject to RCRA. See 10 C.F.R. § 962.3 (1993). 
The implications of such specific exemptions concerning radioactive waste have been enor-
mous, for no party other than the DOE can regulate the release of these radioactive materials. 
Because the AEA maintains exclusive jurisdiction over radioactive source, special nuclear, and 
byproduct material, states and the EPA cannot bring enforcement actions to remedy problems 
concerning the DOE's radioactive contamination. Although the AEA grants an affected citizen 
an administrative remedy to address problems concerning nuclear power and Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission licensed facilities, it grants no rights to citizens regarding the DOE and nuclear 
weapons production. See Dan W. Reicher, Nuclear Energy and Weapons, in SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 873, 969 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993). The AEA states that: 
No action shall be brought against any individual or person for any violation under this 
Act unless and until the Attorney General of the United States has advised the 
Commission with respect to such action and no such action shall be commenced except 
by the Attorney General of the United States .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2271(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Thus, even if a defense facility's radioactive waste 
spills out onto private individuals' lands, no one can bring an enforcement action requiring the 
DOE to abate its activity. See Reicher, supra, at 969-70. As Reicher suggests, "[t]he inescapable 
conclusion is that EPA-and concomitantly states, citizens, municipalities, and corporations-
simply do not have adequate authority to implement and enforce radiation standards with 
respect to civilian and defense nuclear facilities." [d. at 977. 
268 See Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 235 (statement of J. Winston Porter, Assistant 
Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency). 
269 See Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 18 (statement of Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney 
General, State of Washington). 
270 Wolverton, supra note 30, at 577. 
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some immunity from prospective lawsuits or other regulatory actions 
against it, the doctrine traces back to the goals of the Constitution's 
framers.271 The framers referred to the common law of medieval Eng-
land, where judges appointed by the Crown were expected to refrain 
from ruling against the monarchy272 because, in theory, the "King can 
do no wrong ."273 
Given that a waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but 
must be unequivocally expressed,"274 federal agencies, with the sup-
port of the DOJ, declared that federal facilities were not subject to 
section 6001 of RCRA because the provision was not explicit in its 
waiver of sovereign immunity.275 By asserting that section 6001 did 
not unambiguously waive the government's sovereign immunity, the 
DOD and the DOE shielded themselves from administrative orders 
that might have spurred compliance with RCRA, and enforcement 
actions that might have deterred future violations through the threat 
of civil penalties.276 As one state attorney general explained in 1989, 
"[i]t appears that at every opportunity, no matter how clear and 
deliberate the attempt by Congress to waive immunity in environ-
mental matters, the U.S. asserts that the waiver is ambiguous, and 
therefore, state enforcement efforts must fail."277 
In several federal court cases, the DOJ, representing the govern-
ment, successfully staved off state hazardous waste enforcement ac-
tions seeking civil penalties against federal facilities.278 It argued that 
section 6001 did not clearly and unambiguously waive the United 
States' sovereign immunity with respect to civil and criminal penal-
ties.279 For example, in United States v. Washington, the United 
271 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 46. 
2721d. 
273 Lansing v. County of McLean, 359 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978). 
274 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 
1, 4 (1969». 
275 See Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 166 (statement ofV. Ann Strickland, Deputy Counsel, 
National Audubon Society). 
276 See id. at 147 (testimony of Shira A. Flax, Washington Representative, Sierra Club); ld. at 
165 (statement of V. Ann Strickland, Deputy Counsel, National Audubon Society). 
277 Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 18 (statement of Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney 
General, State of Washington). 
278 See infra notes 280-91 and accompanying text. 
279 H.R. REP. No. 102-111, supra note 8, at 5. See, e.g., California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977 (9th 
Cir. 1985); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 
1986); Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.C. 1986). The DOJ also has 
relied on the doctrine of sovereign immunity to prevent the EPA from issuing administrative 
orders to federal facilities to correct RCRA violations. Hearings 1989, supra note 181, at 166 
(statement of V. Ann Strickland, Deputy Counsel, National Audubon Society). The DOJ main-
tains that such orders serve only as the method for enforcing requirements, yet are not 
themselves "requirements" as stated in RCRA section 6001. ld. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988). 
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the imposition 
of civil penalties in a state RCRA action against the DOE because 
"the only unequivocal and express reference to sovereign immunity 
in [section 6001] is directed at court-ordered sanctions for a violation 
of an injunction."2&l In other words, the court found that RCRA only 
authorized the imposition of civil penalties as sanctions to enforce 
injunctive relief against a federal facility. Similarly, in an action by the 
State of California against the Veterans Administration for state 
hazardous waste disposal violations, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that criminal sanctions are an enforce-
ment mechanism and do not constitute a "requirement"281 for the 
purposes of section 6001 of RCRA.282 Section 6001, therefore, did 
not waive the government's immunity with respect to criminal sanc-
tions.28:l 
Sovereign immunity at times also affected citizens' opportunities to 
enforce RCRA and to hold the government accountable for its actions. 
In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (M.E.S.S.) v. Weinberger, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 
precluded a RCRA citizen suit action against the DOD.284 A citizens 
group sought injunctive and declaratory relief and civil penalties 
against the DOD for alleged RCRA violations, however the court held 
that the citizen suit provision of RCRA is inapplicable.285 The court 
asserted that a literal reading of RCRA reveals that Congress did not 
waive sovereign immunity concerning the imposition of civil penalties 
against federal facilities under RCRA.286 Additionally, it narrowly 
200 872 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1989). 
281 See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
282 Walters, 751 F.2d at 978, 979. 
283 [d. at 978. The court stated: 
Section [6001] has enough clear and unambiguous language to overcome the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity to permit requirements, which the Court held had not been 
waived in Hancock [v. Train]. But the differences between former § 118 [of the Clean 
Air Act] and [§ 6001] do not show at all, much less clearly and unambiguously, an intent 
to subject the United States to criminal sanctions in addition to permit requirements. 
[d. at 979. See also Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(section 6001 of RCRA did not unambiguously waive federal sovereign immunity from civil 
penalties); Meyer, 644 F. Supp. at 223 (civil penalties for violations of state requirements not 
applicable to defendant because such penalties "appear to be a means by which requirements 
are enforced and not requirements themselves"); Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex 
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159, 163 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (government immunity not waived under section 
6001 of RCRA concerning state statute imposing strict liability for negligent release of hazard-
ous waste material). 
284 McClellan, 655 F. Supp. at 605. 
285 [d. at 603--04. 
286 [d. 
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construed the definition of "person" found in RCRA's citizen suit 
provision and concluded that the United States is not a "person" 
subject to suit for the purposes of the provision.287 Therefore, even 
citizens could be barred from holding the military accountable for its 
wastes.288 
The United States Supreme Court further supported the DOJ's 
interpretation of section 6001 of RCRA in a recent decision which 
ultimately prompted the enactment of the Federal Facilities Compli-
ance Act.289 In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the Court 
held that federal facilities were subject to coercive fines intended to 
force compliance with injunctions or other court orders, however 
sovereign immunity had not been waived with regard to punitive 
fines, or punishments for past statutory and regulatory violations.290 
Additionally, the Court held that states could not obtain civil penalties 
against the government through RCRA's citizen suit provision, for the 
United States is not a "person" within the meaning of the word in the 
provision.291 
b. Cases and Controversies 
Although section 3008 of RCRA292 authorizes the EPA to issue 
administrative orders to fellow agencies, including the DOD and the 
DOE, the DOJ undermines EPA authority to enforce those orders 
through a policy which prohibits one agency or department of the 
government from bringing suit against another agency or depart-
ment.293 The DOJ contends that intrabranch disputes do not present 
a justiciable controversy which satisfies the article III case or contro-
287 See id. 
288 [d. Not all courts precluded the implementation of citizen suits, however. For example, in 
California v. United States Department of the Navy, the Ninth Circuit held that civil penalties 
were unavailable under the civil provision of the Clean Water Act because the section did not 
imply a cause of action for civil penalties. 845 F.2d 222, 224-25 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the 
court did suggest that civil penalties were available in a citizen suit against a federal facility. 
[d. 
289 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct. 1627 (1992). See infm Section IV (discuss-
ing the Federal Facilities Compliance Act). 
290 [d. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1631, 1635. 
291 [d. at 1634-35. A subsequent case, Maine v. Department of Navy, further solidified this 
position, as the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that sovereign 
immunity barred the state of Maine from imposing civil penalties against the Navy for past 
violations of RCRA at a Navy shipyard. 973 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 1992). 
292 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (h) (1988). 
293 Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Fedeml Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 324 
(1990). 
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versy requirement of the United States Constitution.294 The DOJ's 
position derives from the requirement that parties in a suit be adverse 
in fact. 295 Technically, if one agency or department sues another, "the 
United States actually is suing itself," calling into question "whether 
the intrabranch dispute is genuinely adverse."296 If no adversity of 
interest exists between the opposing parties, a matter cannot and will 
not be considered by a court.297 
The DOJ relies on decisions such as United States v. Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) in reaching the conclusion that suits 
brought by the EPA against sister agencies are not justiciable.298 In 
ICC, The United States disputed an unfavorable ICC rate order.299 
The court distinguished the dispute from those that are nonjusticiable 
intragovernmental disputes.3oo It held that the dispute was actionable 
because it was between the United States and carriers permitted by 
the ICC to charge allegedly unlawful rates.30l Given that the dispute 
was between the government and private persons, '''the established 
principle that a person cannot create a justiciable controversy against 
himself' had no application."302 The DOJ infers from this holding that 
an action by the United States against an executive officer or agency 
requires a "nongovernmental 'real party and interest."'303 Therefore, 
because the EPA is a government entity, the DOJ bars it from bring-
ing an action against another branch of the government. This policy 
effectively eliminates the EPA's ability to enforce its compliance or-
ders and bring suits against the DOD and the DOE for their failure 
to comply with environmental laws. Accordingly, the EPA has stated 
in its Federal Facilities Compliance Strategy that it "will not bring 
civil judicial suit against Executive Branch Agencies .... EPA gen-
erally will not assess civil penalties against Federal facilities . . .. 
EPA will negotiate Compliance Agreements or Consent Orders with 
Federal agencies."304 
294 See Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 10; U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
295 Steinberg, supra note 293, at 324. 
296 [d. 
297 See Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 64. 
296 337 U.S. 426 (1949). See Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 672. 
299 337 u.s. at 428. 
300 [d. at 430-31. 
301 [d. 
302 Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 673 (memorandum of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Legal Counsel) (citing United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 
337 U.S. 426, 431 (1949)). 
303 [d. 
304 NGAJN AAG REPORT, supra note 4, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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c. Unitary Executive Theory 
The DOJ also contends under the unitary executive theory that 
enforcement actions and even administrative orders brought by one 
agency against a sister agency interfere with the President's author-
ity under article II of the Constitution to manage the executive 
branch.305 The unitary executive theory originated with the Constitu-
tion's framers, whose goal was to create a unified executive branch 
that did not direct intrabranch squabbles to the justice system.3oo 
Article II vested the executive power in the President to manage and 
coordinate the officers within his branch, and to ensure "the branch 
speaks with one voice."307 In mandating that the President alone shall 
execute the laws,308 it directed the President to resolve disputes be-
tween executive departments309 and establish "general administrative 
control of those executing the laws."310 
The unitary executive theory also finds support in two Executive 
Orders. Executive Order 12,088 requires the Administrator of EPA 
to "make every effort to resolve conflicts regarding [violations of 
environmental statutes] between Executive Agencies .... [I]f the 
Administrator cannot resolve a conflict the Administrator shall re-
quest the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to resolve 
the conflict."311 Executive Order 12,146, similarly, decrees that 
"[ w ]henever two or more Executive agencies are unable to resolve a 
legal dispute between them ... each agency is encouraged to submit 
the dispute to the Attorney General."312 
The DOJ thus contends that EPA administrative orders and en-
forcement suits obstruct the President's unitary management of the 
executive branch.313 Accordingly, these actions technically are prohib-
ited under the unitary executive theory, and thus restrict the EPA's 
305 Steinberg, supra note 293, at 325; see Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 208 (statement of 
F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division). 
306 Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 208-11 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant 
Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division). 
307 [d. at 209; Steinberg, supra note 293, at 325. 
308 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ("[the President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed"). 
309 Steinberg, supra note 293, at 325. 
310 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926). 
311 Steinberg, supra note 293, at 329 (citing Executive Order No. 12,088,3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), 
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988». 
312 Steinberg, supra note 293, at 329 (citing Executive Order No. 12,146,3 C.F.R. 409 (1980), 
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988». 
313 Hearing 1987, supra note 186, at 63. 
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authority to induce the DOD and the DOE to comply with environ-
mentallaws.314 
2. No Legal Alternatives Analysis 
Given the enormous threat that the military's waste management 
techniques have presented to the public, and the past failure of, and 
restrictions on, efforts to regulate the DOD and the DOE, citizens 
frequently were left to fend for themselves to ensure their protection 
from military wastes. Unfortunately, lawful attempts to confront these 
problems often fared unsuccessfully. For example, in 1982, citizens on 
Cape Cod formed a group which pursued many strategies aimed at 
uncovering and eliminating the Massachusetts Military Reservation's 
disposal practices.315 The group faced measured resistance with every 
initiative.316 It was forbidden from speaking at military base public 
meetings, denied its initial request for a health study, told that ele-
vated cancer rates on Cape Cod were due to '''lifestyle factors' such 
as smoking and diet,"317 and ignored when it appealed to then-Gover-
nor Michael Dukakis.318 These citizens also requested answers from 
the military detailing the extent of the hazardous waste problems at 
the base.319 The military told the citizens to be quiet and added that 
such matters were "none of [the citizens'] business and [the citizens] 
had no right to know" about the base's contamination problems.320 
Demonstrations ensued, resulting in the arrest of one protester who 
laid in the road at the base's entrance to protest the pollution.321 At 
trial, the judge sentenced the protester to two months in jail for 
disorderly conduct and noted that the defendant's punishment would 
serve as an example to discourage further types of actions.322 
The experience of the citizens on Cape Cod typifies the roadblocks 
the public faced in pursuing various strategies addressing the mili-
tary's contamination problems. For although many cases instruct that 
legal alternatives to civil resistance always exist for individuals to 
confront a grave and imminent harm,323 in reality few options could 
314 [d. at 672 (memorandum of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel). 
315 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 148. 
316 [d. 
317 [d. at 148-49. 
318 [d. 
319 [d. at 149. 
300 Satchell, supra note 140. 
321 SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 149. 
322 [d. 
323 See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text. 
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effectively deter the military's unbridled contamination activity. As 
indicated, intractable legal issues concerning federal facilities' compli-
ance with environmental laws allowed the military to elude RCRA.324 
Congressional efforts to regulate federal facilities were hamstrung by 
courts' strict interpretation of section 6001 of RCRA, and the DOJ 
undermined the EPA by constitutionally challenging its enforcement 
authority.325 Thus, the military's contamination activity was not the 
intended result of the "will of the majority, legitimately expressed."326 
Rather, it occurred because the legislature was unsuccessful in its 
attempt to subject federal facilities to RCRA supervision, and be-
cause the DOJ has objected to the EPA regulating these facilities in 
the same manner as private polluters. Consequently, citizens' appeals 
to RCRA or the EPA for help concerning this pollution often were 
fruitless. Similarly, citizens were stonewalled when courts prohibited 
citizen suits against the military,327 for they could not absolutely de-
pend on the legal system to redress the illegal harms they were 
committed to combatting.328 
The military's recalcitrance concerning environmental regulation 
and its indifference to public welfare thus confirmed that citizens' 
pursuit of legal alternatives in many instances would be futile and 
offered no hope for change.329 Rather than cooperating with citizens 
and striving to improve its waste disposal practices, the military 
callously dumped its wastes and often maintained secrecy concerning 
these practices to avoid regulation.330 Hence, even if "thousands of 
opportunities"331 existed theoretically for citizens to air their con-
cerns, none of these lawful alternatives realistically could ensure the 
324 See supra notes 268--314 and accompanying text. 
326 See supra notes 280--314 and accompanying text. 
326 See United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 591 (8th Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 
(1987) ("[protesters'] lack of results might mean only that the will of the majority, legitimately 
expressed, had prevailed"); see supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra notes 284-91 and accompanying text. 
328 See State v. Hund, 708 P.2d 621, 623 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 713 P.2d 1058 (Or. 
1986). See also supra notes 280--314 and accompanying text. 
329 See Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); supra note 
244 and accompanying text. 
330 Compare People v. Gray,571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 861 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (New York City closed 
cycling lane without advance warning or discussion with public). For example, the DOE's Rocky 
Flats and Fernald facilities demonstrated a long history of environmental violations and con-
cealment of these violations. H.R. REP. No. 102-111, supra note 8, at 4. Similarly, the OTA noted 
that the public historically had great difficulty in obtaining information from the DOE about 
environmental and health issues at its nuclear weapons complex. OTA REPORT, supra note 10, 
at 66. The DOD also has refused to divulge information at the EPA's urging concerning its 
releases of toxic materials into the air, water, and land. SHULMAN, supra note 15, at 56. 
331 United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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military's compliance with hazardous waste laws. Civil resistance, 
therefore, offered a badly needed and justifiable alternative by which 
citizens could simultaneously uphold laws proscribing hazardous waste 
disposal, and provide for their own protection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In October, 1992, Congress clarified the longstanding ambiguity 
concerning the language of section 6001 of RCRA and its waiver of 
sovereign immunity by passing the Federal Facilities Compliance 
Act.332 In overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Department of 
Energy v. Ohio, this legislation expressly waives the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity, and expands RCRA to require federal 
facilities to comply with federal, state, interstate, and local solid waste 
laws.333 The Act amends the definition of "person" to include explicitly 
each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States.334 
Federal facilities now are subject to the "requirements" enunciated 
in RCRA's original language from 1976-administrative orders and 
civil or administrative fines or penalties pursuant to hazardous waste 
laws.335 
Additionally, the Act authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to 
commence administrative enforcement actions "against any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, or judi-
cial branch of the Federal Government,"336 and states must use all 
funds collected from penalties and fines imposed for violations of 
RCRA for environmental improvement or protection projects.337 The 
Act further requires the Administrator of the EPA to undertake an 
annual inspection of each facility owned or operated by the United 
States that is subject to RCRA, and to make the records of such 
inspections available to the public.338 
The Federal Facilities Compliance Act on its face promises to en-
sure public and environmental protection for years to come, for it 
explicitly directs federal facilities to comply with environmental laws, 
or suffer the penalties for non-compliance.339 By according enforce-
332 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6903, 6908, 6924, 6927, 6939c--{j93ge, 6961, 6965 (West 1993). 
333 Id. § 6961(a)(3). 
334 Id. § 6903(15). 
335 Id. § 6961(a). See also H.R. REP. No. 102-111, supra note 8, at 21. 
336 42 U.S.C.A. § 6961(b)(1) (West 1993). 
337Id. § 6961(c). 
338 Id. § 6927(c). 
339 See id. § 696Ha). The Act does not, however, address the regulation of purely radioactive 
waste. Therefore, unless the Atomic Energy Act is amended to allow for the regulation of 
1994] DEFENDING AGAINST DEFENSE 707 
ment authority to states, citizens, and the EPA, a powerful recourse 
now exists to address the military's waste disposal practices. Citizens 
presumably will no longer face the insurmountable struggles against 
the military that they encountered in the years prior to the enactment 
of this legislation. Consequently, the acts of civil resistance that could 
be justified by the necessity defense five, ten, or fifteen years ago, 
today may be unnecessary and unwarranted. 
Yet the Federal Facilities Compliance Act does not provide every 
answer for the problems concerning the military's wastes. First, ques-
tions linger concerning the Act's constitutionality.340 If the DOJ's po-
sition is correct concerning the cases and controversies clause of the 
Constitution and the unitary executive theory, the portions of the Act 
concerning the EPA's authority may be constitutionally suspect.341 In 
the event that the EPA remains helpless to bring enforcement actions 
against the DOD and the DOE, the public will bear a greater burden 
of attempting to regulate the military itself. Second, the Act does not 
ensure that every military facility in every community will comply 
with hazardous waste laws, nor does it provide immediate protection 
for citizens who face an imminent hazard from military contamination. 
If state governments or the EPA fail to respond to such exigencies, 
citizens may be left to their own devices to ameliorate the military's 
hazardous waste contamination problems.342 Thus, while the Federal 
Facilities Compliance Act creates new avenues to address the mili-
tary's waste disposal activities, these avenues must successfully deter, 
if not eliminate the military's longstanding practices. For if citizens 
are left with no means to protect themselves or the environment, once 
again they may be justified under the necessity defense for civil 
resistance protests. 
radioactive waste, this waste will continue to remain immune from external oversight. See supra 
note 267. 
340 Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance with Environmental 
Laws: Where Do We Gojrom Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 801, 820 (1993). 
341 [d. at 820, 832--33. 
342 Although citizens can rely on citizen suits to combat future problems with the military, the 
expense of these actions may make them an unrealistic alternative for many individuals. For 
example, a citizens group wanted to pursue a lawsuit against the Army for its contamination 
activities at the Cornhusker Ammunition Plant in Grand Island, Nebraska. SHULMAN, supra 
note 15, at 79, 81. However, the group could not afford the exorbitant legal costs for the action, 
nor could it risk losing the suit and being required to pay the Army's attorneys fees. [d. Thus, 
if citizen suits are not a realistic alternative for individuals lacking the means to bring them, 
some courts may be receptive to civil resistance protesters' arguments that no legal alternatives 
existed to combat the harm they faced. Consequently, the mere availability of citizen suits does 
not unilaterally eliminate the application of the necessity defense to future military protests. 
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Fortunately, however, the future concerning the military's contami-
nation problems appears promising, for the public has become increas-
ingly involved in the struggle against the improper disposal of DOD 
and DOE wastes.343 Citizen coalitions from California to Cape Cod 
have formed to act as watchdogs, and to pressure the military to 
comply with environmentallaws.344 National organizations such as the 
National Toxics Campaign Fund and the Military Toxics Network are 
among the many forces which lobby at the national level, and lawfully 
protest at the local level to ensure that the military discloses the full 
extent of its toxic chemical releases and permits citizen involvement 
in local environmental clean-up initiatives.345 In addition, the EPA has 
chartered a federal advisory committee comprised of representatives 
offederal agencies, tribal and state governments and associations, and 
local and national environmental, community, and labor organizations 
that is providing recommendations to the military and to other federal 
agencies concerning their environmental restoration efforts.346 Given 
this groundswell of effort to remedy the military's, as well as all 
federal facilities' waste problems, civil resistance hopefully will be-
come an outmoded and unnecessary means of redress. 
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